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ABSTRACT 
The paper examines formation and sustainability of Pay-As-You-Go pension systems 
within the consequences of the ageing of population. Parametric reforms rather than 
institutional transformation of Pay-As-You-Go systems into funded pension schemes are 
advocated. Following the modern theories of family economics and contrary to the mainstream 
works on the issue, reciprocal causation between pension systems and ageing is stressed. The 
paper concludes that the World Bank’s first pillar adjustment for maintaining the Pay-As-You-
Go schemes achieves its objectives only if it is focused on all elements of the Pay-As-You-Go 
system. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decades, the world has witnessed dramatic socioeconomic transformations, 
including intensified trends of an ageing of population, which directly decreases the supply of 
workforce for labour markets and increases the number of retired people. Social insurance 
pensions for those groups of population can be either Pay-As-You-Go1 or funded, however, as 
Mackenzie et al (1997) indicate the former is most vulnerable to ageing because benefits received 
by current pensioners are funded by current contributors; whereas in funded schemes “each 
generation accumulates assets during working life which are used to finance its retirement 
pensions” (Pemberton 2000, p. 1873). This essay argues that by appropriate adjustments 
countries with Pay-As-You-Go pensions can further afford to sustain this system regardless of 
the consequences of ageing. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the historical determinants of 
Pay-As-You-Go formation and persistence; section 3 explains the economic nature and the 
challenge of ageing to Pay-As-You-Go system; while section 4 presents tools for Pay-As-You-Go 
adjustment; section 5 concludes.  
  
2. THE ORIGIN AND PERSISTENCE OF PAY-AS-YOU-GO  
SYSTEMS 
Although it is obvious that the current setting is completely different from that existing 
in the first half of the twentieth century, analysing the underling factors that defined the 
formation of pension structures may help in understanding the challenge of ageing for Pay-As-
You-Go systems. There is no unequivocal answer as to why some countries prioritised Pay-As-
                                                 
1 Some Pay-As-You-Go schemes are administered by the corporations in a private sector. In this case, payment of 
benefits is dependent on future corporate earnings. However, such schemes are restricted in most counties due to a 
high risk associated with non-payment (Barr & Diamond, 2006). 
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You-Go structures while others developed funding systems, however, it is possible to identify a 
set of reasons that determined the path of development. According to Hannah (1986), modern 
old-age pension schemes stem from the late nineteenth century, when large private companies 
and civil service branches established pension policies. In 1889, German chancellor Bismarck 
enacted the first national and compulsory old age insurance system, where contributions were 
split among the government, employers and employees (Börsch-Supan et al, 2004). 
Nevertheless, most pension systems were formed in the first part of the twentieth century (refer 
to the appendix), when the interrelation of three decisive factors had a major influence. 
Firstly, this period was associated with sharp inflationary shocks with major 
redistributive and impoverishing consequences in many then industrialized countries, and as 
Perroti (2006) argues, a majority of the population in these countries began supporting state-
controlled social security policies. However, countries which managed to keep inflation of 
relatively low levels mostly developed market funding for pension systems. Secondly, 
according to Pegano and Volpin (2005), decisions on the formation of pension systems were 
strongly affected by political preferences. In relatively more democratic countries, where the 
middle class had a significant financial participation, the development of financial markets was 
preferred, while relatively undemocratic governments chose limiting and controlling of 
investors activities and thus preferred Pay-As-You-Go systems. Thirdly, as Maddison (1987) 
observes, high economic growth rates and increasing real wages together with a demographic 
boom in some countries meant low initial costs of setting and almost inevitably determined the 
formation of mostly contributory, tax-financed and Pay-As-You-Go pension systems.  
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 Simultaneously, pension systems became a classic case of the concept of path 
dependency2, an idea that “institutions and policies adopted at one point serve to limit the 
variety of plausible alternatives at latter points” (Graefe 2004, p. 3). Exactly this kind of 
relationship is described by Tepe (2006), who observes the strong path dependency of Pay-As-
You-Go pensions in different welfare regimes within which they have been developed, while 
Anderson (2004) emphasizes the role of party politics and path dependent development of 
funding pension schemes in Swedish, Dutch and Danish pension systems. Moreover, according 
to Myles and Pierson (2001), because governments were making pension promises decades in 
advance, countries which introduced Pay-As-You-Go systems immediately after the Second 
World War had very limited options for modifying them fundamentally, undertaking mainly 
actuarial reforms and partially introducing funded schemes.     
 
3. PAY-AS-YOU-GO SYSTEMS, AGEING AND  
ECONOMICS 
Table 1 in the appendix provides summary information on pension systems in 24 OECD 
countries, including the percentage of privately funded pension assets over GDP as a rough 
scale of Pay-As-You-Go systems (OECD Newsletter, 2005). Overall, the variation is remarkable, 
but it is hard to define what the crossing line from a Pay-As-You-Go to a funding system is. 
Nonetheless, mandatory public pension3 plans are central to the center of the retirement 
insurance systems in most of the developed world. Functionally, properly designed Pay-As-
You-Go schemes serve as effective mechanisms: (1) to deal with the problems of informational 
                                                 
2 Concept of path dependency originally stemmed from David’s (1985) critique on the efficiency assumptions in 
economics. 
3 Although, these schemes, within the particular country, possess some degree of universality, they are not 
necessarily the same for the different sectors of economy (Kune et al, 1993). 
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asymmetry, missing markets and uncertainty (Barr, 2006); (2) to eliminate poverty and hardship 
among the elderly by securing residents of a specified age with, at least, a minimum income for 
a decent life after retirement (Willmore, 2004); (3) to reallocate incomes on a lifetime basis “by 
paying pensions to low earners that are a higher percentage of their previous earnings” (Barr & 
Diamond, 2006); (4) to sustain a macroeconomic outlook in general and labour-market 
incentives in particular (Milevski, 2006). However, not all of these functions were initial 
objectives of the system and have been developed gradually.  
The definitive period of public pension systems’ formation in developed countries 
coincided with the beginning of what the United Nations (2001) in its influential study World 
Population Ageing 1950-2050 identifies as a “demographic transition”, threatening the 
sustainability of Pay-As-You-Go systems (Kohout, 2005). For instance, in all countries of the 
developed world, the old-age dependency ratio – the percentage of the elderly people (65 + 
years) to the working-age (15 - 64 years) people – was 12% in 1950, 21% in 2000 and is predicted 
to increase to 44% in 20504 (refer to the appendix) (Bettendorf & Heijda, 2006, p. 2390). However, 
according to Holzman (1988), from 1950 to 1970 a growing proportion of people reaching 
retirement age played an insignificant role in rising pension expenditure. The real pressure 
stemmed from the extension of benefits and eligibility, including the reduction of the retirement 
age: the process that Graebner (1980) recalls as the “triumph of retirement”. 
Since the 1980s ageing has already been responsible for problems associated with Pay-
As-You-Go systems. According to Bond et al (1993) it especially intensified with the 
                                                 
4 Obviously, no demographic projections may be absolutely certain. According to past experience forecasters 
generally assume ageing trends to revert to some trend level observed in the past. Therefore, the projections do not 
consider systematic changes in the relevant parameters (fertility rates, migration, etc) that define demographic 
development (Lee & Tuljapurkar, 2001). 
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convergence of three major trends in the second half of the 20th century: (i) the improvement in 
life expectancy due to a reduction in child mortality rates associated with the development of 
health services and medical advances in the prevention of fatal diseases in childhood; (ii) the 
improvement in life expectancy of older people due to increased quality of life after the 1950s 
and to a lesser extent, the achievements of medical science5; (iii) and the long-term downward 
drift in the birth rate, making the proportion of older people increasingly bigger than proportion 
of children in the population. If the first two factors are largely self-explanatory, the decline in 
fertility rates in the context of Pay-As-You-Go pension systems attracts more attention.  
Conventional models of population economics treat fertility as exogenous and consider 
the effect of ageing on inflow and outflow of Pay-As-You-Go systems. In contrast, recent models 
regard fertility as an endogenous variable affected by Pay-As-You-Go systems (Rosati, 1996). 
Family economists suggest that the number of children per household is based on a comparison 
of costs and utility gain that is followed by a decisions on fertility, while cost-benefit analysis 
consists of transfers from the parents to the young in the form of educational effort, and 
financial transfers from the young to the parents through a Pay-As-You-Go tax-system (Alders 
& Broer 2005, p. 1076). Steadily rising wages and better career prospects increase the 
opportunity costs of having children, while according to Sinn (2004), “the Pay-As-You-Go 
system serves as insurance against not having children and as an enforcement device for 
ungrateful children who are unwilling to pay their parents a pension”6 (p. 1135). Therefore, 
since parent fertility decisions affect everybody’s pension benefits and have strong social 
                                                 
5
 As Mckeown (1979) insists future ageing trends are likely to come from transformations in economic and social 
environments, rather than from treatment of already occurred diseases. 
6 We do observe positive correlation between pension funds and fertility rates in OECD countries (Pearson’s r = .32), 
however, relation is moderate and statistically insignificant (P-Value = .13), 
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externalities, Cremer (2006) advocates a policy of linking Pay-As-You-Go benefits or 
contributions to individuals’ fertility options. 
In addition to financial vulnerability, an important issue is Pay-As-You-Go’s effect on 
real economy (Ehrlich & Kim, 2007). Excluding the demographic shocks, the sustainability of 
Pay-As-You-Go systems in models designed by Samuelson (1958) and Aaron (1966) relies on the 
annual growth rate of real labour income that is also the growth rate of the national economy, 
whereas the sustainability of funded pension schemes relies on the interest rate of capital assets 
i.e. the marginal productivity of capital. The latter rate in neo-classical economic models exceeds 
the former, creating incentives for transition from Pay-As-You-Go to funding systems, though 
Brunner (1996) identifies two obstacles for such a transition: “paying for the pensions of the 
retired and accumulating a sufficient stock of capital from which their own pensions could be 
financed” (p. 132). In addition, for small open economies due to international externalities 
Pareto improvement only occurs when all countries chose to switch simultaneously –  a process 
that is highly unlikely to happen and hence is referred as the isolation paradox by Pemberton 
(2000, p. 1874). However, Saint-Paul (1992) also perceives Pay-As-You-Go systems as 
deteriorating for endogenous economic models where growth is in large determined by 
aggregate capital stock, because a non-funding Pay-As-You-Go systems discourage people from 
accumulating private savings and hence impedes economic development.  
On the other hand, Kemnitz and Wigger (2000) insist that economic growth models 
should more intensively take into account human capital investments, which completely change 
the causal relationship between Pay-As-You-Go systems and Pareto-optimal resource allocation 
(p. 674). Originally developed by Lucas (1988), this economic growth model is driven by an 
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increase in productivity. Since human capital fully depreciates for productivity growth after 
retirement, permanent human capital investment in succeeding generations is required, through 
the educational decisions of the parents. Therefore, the rate of return in Pay-As-You-Go 
economics depends not just on the number of workers, but also on productivity growth (Cremer 
et al, 2006). The Pay-As-You-Go system provides tax-payers with socially optimal incentives to 
invest in human capital and to support growth-oriented policies and leads to efficient economic 
growth models since it guaranties that the older generation will receive a stake from younger 
generations’ productivity; whereas in funding systems less time and effort is devoted to human 
capital accumulation and agents cannot expect to benefit directly from growth policies 
(Bellettini, 1999, p. 796).  
 
4. ADJUSTMENT OF PAY-AS-YOU-GO  
SYSTEMS  
Two sets of options are considered for Pay-As-You-Go pension adjustments to ageing. 
First, the institutional transformation of Pay-As-You-Go into funded pension schemes; and 
second, the parametric reforms of the Pay-As-You-Go system. The first option has been 
examined across many countries. From the beginning of the 1990s this issue became one of the 
central points of global debate on social security. The World Bank (see Averting the old age 
crisis, 1994) initially strongly advocated the privatisation, however later several distinctive 
scholars invalidated the main arguments underlying privatization thrust (see Stigletz 2001; Barr, 
2006). Nevertheless, the scope of this essay is limited to parametric reforms, which in turn differ 
according to the countries considered. For example, in rapidly ageing Eastern European 
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populations, experiencing the same Pay-As-You-Go sustainability problem7 in large due to 
undeveloped governmental institutions and substantial emigration waves of the local 
population, the first and simplest policy option might be improving administration of existing 
Pay-As-You-Go Systems8 (Aleksandrova & Velokova, 2003). According to the World Bank 
(2006), the recent administrative reforms in Bulgaria and the Russian Federation were 
satisfactory, resulting in increased revenues and better client services, while Pay-As-You-Go 
adjustment projects in Hungary, Latvia and Romania had implementation difficulties.  
Emigration problems in transitional countries may turn into age-specific immigration 
adjustments to the Pay-As-You-Go system in the developed world. Leers et al (2003) insist that 
immigration may alleviate the gap in intergenerational transfer systems by decreasing the 
dependency ratio. Furthermore, Razin and Sadka (1999) observe that immigration is beneficial 
to the elderly since migrants’ contributions benefit retirees’ pensions, while it does not harm the 
young population because immigrants increase the tax base and therefore the government’s 
revenues often benefiting the young people is society. Nonetheless, as Marchand and Pestieau 
(1991, p. 450) warn, emigrants may adapt rapidly to the low fertility rates of the destination 
country, ageing as the rest of the population do. The objective of a higher number of workers in 
the economy may be successfully achieved by active labour market policies (ALMP), focusing 
on monetary incentive programs rather than on public employment schemes (Fertig et al, 2006). 
In addition, an increased female labour supply is capable of offsetting a shortage of funds for 
Pay-As-You-Go and as Swedish example shows can lead to increased female participation, with 
                                                 
7
 Although, their economic development is far worse than in OECD countries. 
8
 Through last decade the World Bank for Pay-As-You-Go purposes assisted Eastern European transitional countries 
with 3.34 billion dollars. 
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high fertility rates (Daly, 2000). Nevertheless, as Marchand and Pestieau (1991) rightly note, this 
option is only capable of postponing the problem because additional workers will eventually 
retire, becoming a further burden on the system. 
One possible scenario for coping with ageing in the Pay-As-You-Go system is a delay the 
age when workers become eligible for pensions and to allow older people, willing and able to 
work, to continue working in their jobs well beyond the current retirement age. Seike (2003) 
defines this policy option as a way to establish “an age-free active society”. The initial steps 
toward this solution of the problem have been undertaken by several countries. As an 
illustration, the German government has enforced a policy called “Campaign 50 Plus”, which 
secures substantial benefits for employers who employ workers over 50, including wage 
subsidies and retraining (Börsch-Supan et al, 2004). The employment policies in the Netherlands 
promote part time jobs with special emphasise on the expanding work opportunities for older 
people (Carey, 2002), while, the United States made probably the earliest attempts to set a 
flexible retirement age demonstrated in the “Age Discrimination in Employment Act” of 1967 
(Bortz, 1972). Simultaneously, Sayan and Kiraci (2001), reviewing the Pay-As-You-Go 
adjustment in Turkey, support a gradual increase in the minimum retirement age rather than a 
once-for-all change, because convincing workers to postpone retirement in the near future is not 
politically feasible (p. 958).  
Reducing incentives for early retirement may be executed using several conceptual tools. 
According to Chand and Jaeger (1996), governments can directly reduce accrual factors that 
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define replacement rates٭, can increase the number of years to which the replacement ratio is 
applied, or can simply combine both measures, which would mean an immediate reduction of 
individual pensions. Leibfritz (2003) also advocates an increase in net pension wealth from 
working an additional year, contrary to paying additional contributions with little or no 
increase in future pension gains. Modification of the replacement indexation is a good option in 
this regard (Jousten, 2007). In Japan and partially in France, the indexation rate is linked to 
nominal or net wages that in turn are defined by changing labour productivity (Capretta, 2007). 
While this method preserves the gross replacement rate for the elderly, it encourages retirement 
and does not allow saving of resources for an increasing number of pensioners. The more cost-
effective policy involves an indexation replacement rate to consumer price index, which means 
“an erosion of replacement rates over the lifetime of the pensioner.” However, it leads to 
straightforward protection from purchasing power loss for pensioners; In other words, this 
policy associates higher productivity growth with lower replacement rates and thus brings 
long-term costs down for better financing the growing older (Chand & Jaeger 1996, p. 24). 
Ageing could also be a different way of looking at pension policies and incentive for a 
shift in paradigm that may result in new insights into Pay-As-You-Go systems. For example, the 
OECD (2000) advocates a modern pension model with comprehensive coverage, sustainable 
financing and components of private pension funds in public procurement (p. 46). In this 
regard, probably the most promising new paradigmatic application is Notional Defined-
Contribution systems (NDC). Maintaining central elements of the Pay-As-You-Go system, it has 
been initially tested Latvia, Sweden, Italy and Poland (Plenipotentiary, 1997). With the NDC 
                                                 
٭ The replacement rate is a person’s pension as a percentage of his or her working income prior to retirement 
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framework, which makes explicit the actuarial mathematics and trade-offs inherited in any Pay-
As-You-Go system, the employees pay a certain percentage of their earnings into notional 
individual accounts (Lindeman, 2003). Governments also credit these accounts with notional 
interest rates according to their fiscal capacity that in turn is affected by ageing trends (Barr & 
Diamond, 2006). After achieving retirement age, individuals’ notional accumulations are 
converted into benefits which reflect the basic actuarial principle of the account (Kruse, 2003). 
Nonetheless, the most visible solution for maintaining the Pay-As-You-Go system is the 
implementation of a policy that is focused on all elements of the system. In most cases, separate 
parametric reforms of Pay-As-You-Go, despite showing considerable scope for eliminating 
financial gaps, will not be sufficient to maintain balance in the system.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Overall, despite the intensifying trends of ageing in populations, countries are able and 
keen to sustain Pay-As-You-Go pension systems for the foreseeable future. Firstly, political 
choices and historical circumstances that originally determined the creation of public pension 
systems in the first half of the twentieth century are in modified forms, but still play a major 
role. In modern democracies, the lack of which is believed to have an effect on the initial 
formation of the Pay-As-You-Go system, a medium voter, who steadily becomes older, 
expresses his path dependent commitment to a big welfare state. Secondly, Pay-As-You-Go 
systems play an important societal role by insuring and redistributing welfare among 
individuals, and provide incentives for productivity growth, while switching to alternative 
approaches seems to be costly and no more efficient way to handle those functions, considering 
that nothing can fully control fertility. And thirdly, although the scenarios for individual 
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countries vary depending on already achieved demographic structures and on a set of variables 
that influence the financing of public pensions, all countries possess some mechanisms for 
systematic adjustment of Pay-As-You-Go systems. However, appropriately conducted reforms –  
increasing the retirement age, reducing replacement indexation, supporting emigration, etc –  in 
turn could not be achieved without a high awareness of public choice and a transformation of 
social paradigm in relation to aged individuals and their place in society. The fact that the world 
is becoming older does not only mean that the number of retirees is increasing. More 
importantly, it also means the borders between the young and the elderly are becoming blurred.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: Summary information on pension systems in 24 OECD member countries 
 
Country 
Year  
of first 
program 
Year of major 
program 
Mandatory 
funding 
schemes 
Voluntary 
funding 
schemes 
Funded 
assets 
over GDP 
(2004) 
Fertility 
rates (2003) 
Age 
dependency 
ratio  
(2003)  
Australia 1908 1941 1992  72.7 1.75 0.48 
Austria 1909 1935  x 4.5 1.39 0.47 
Belgium 1900 1967  x 4.1 1.61 0.51 
Canada 1927 1966  x 52.1 1.52 0.45 
Denmark 1891 1964 1964-85  30.0 1.76 0.50 
Finland 1937 1956 1956-85  45.3 1.76 0.49 
France 1910 1945  x 7.0 1.89 0.53 
Germany 1889 1949  x 3.8 1.34 0.47 
Greece 1934 1978-85  x 0.0 1.27 0.50 
Iceland 1909 1969-70 1986  111.9 1.99 0.53 
Ireland 1908 1952  x 42.6 1.98 0.48 
Italy 1919 1969  x 2.6 1.29 0.49 
Japan 1875 1942-44  x 14.2 1.33 0.49 
South Korea 1960 1973 2005  1.7 1.45 0.39 
Mexico 1943-44 1943-44 1997  6.3 2.21 0.60 
Netherlands 1913 1957  x 106.2 1.75 0.48 
New 
Zealand 
1898 1938  x 11.3 1.94 0.51 
Norway 1936 1936 2006  6.8 1.80 0.53 
Portugal 1919 1935  x 11.2 1.42 0.48 
Spain 1919 1939  x 9.0 1.26 0.47 
Sweden 1913 1962 2000 x 12.7 1.71 0.54 
Switzerland 1946 1946 1982  111.6 1.41 0.48 
United 
Kingdom 
1908 1948  x 65.1 1.64 0.52 
United States 1896 1935  x 95.0 2.01 0.50 
        
Country 
Age- 
dependency 
ratio  
(2050) 
Immigration 
rate  
(2000) 
Growth 
rate (2003) 
Interest 
rate (2003) 
Inflation 
rate (2003) 
GINI 
coefficient 
(2000) 
Female 
participation 
rate  
(2001) 
Australia 41 0.90 3.8 5.10 2.8 30.5 66.2 
Austria 51 0.12 0.7 3.40 1.4 25.2 63.3 
Belgium 47 0.10 1.1 5.20 1.6 25 58.7 
Canada 44 0.60 2 3.60 2.8 30.1 70.5 
Denmark 40 0.20 0.4 4.70 2.1 22.5 78.9 
 15 
Finland 44 0.11 1.9 3.30 0.9 26.1 72.5 
France 45 0.08 0.5 3.90 2.1 27.3 58.8 
Germany 54 0.36 -0.1 7.00 1 27.7 63.8 
Greece 58 0.00 4.3 4.30 3.5 34.5 49.2 
Iceland 43 … 4 10.70 2.1 … 82.6 
Ireland 39 … 3.7 2.80 3.5 30.4 56.5 
Italy 60 0.09 0.3 4.10 2.7 34.7 47.8 
Japan 74 … 2.7 1.80 -0.3 31.4 64.4 
South Korea 65 … 3.1 2.00 3.6 31.6 55.6 
Mexico 34 … 1.3 3.8 4.5 48.0 41.6 
Netherlands 43 0.21 -0.9 0.50 2.1 25.1 66.3 
New 
Zealand 
40 … 3.6 4.70 1.8 33.7 67.9 
Norway 40 0.30 0.4 2.60 2.5 26.1 76.4 
Portugal 56 0.12 -1.2 2.80 3.3 35.6 68.3 
Spain 63 0.08 2.4 1.80 3 32.9 50.9 
Sweden 41 0.17 1.6 3.30 1.9 24.3 75.5 
Switzerland 42  -0.4 3.10 0.6 26.7 26.5 
United 
Kingdom 
40 0.15 2.2 2.70 2.9 32.6 67.5 
United States 34 0.33 3.1 … 2.3 35.7 70.7 
 
Presented data come from:  OECD Newsletter (2005); OECD in Figures (2003); OECD Economic 
Outlook (2001); Perroti (2006); and World Development Indicators (2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
 
Table 2: Bivariate correlations matrix between 10 variables theoretically interrelated within Pay-As-
You-Go framework in 24 OECD member countries 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) 
PENSION FUNDS 
04 
1.000          
(2) 
FERTILITY RATE 
2003 
0.319 1.000         
(3) 
AGE DEPENDENCY 
03 
-0.019 0.591 1.000        
(4) 
AGE DEPENDENCY 
2050 
-0.464 -0.803 -0.524 1.000       
(5) 
IMMIGRATION 
2000 
0.468 0.267 -0.340 -0.412 1.000      
(6) 
GROWTH  
2003 
0.082 0.216 -0.043 0.011 0.280 1.000     
(7) 
INTEREST RATE 
2003 
0.093 0.175 0.249 -0.155 0.235 0.225 1.000    
(8) 
INFLATION  
2003 
-0.163 0.247 0.097 -0.181 0.071 0.215 -0.088 1.000   
(9) 
GINI  
2000 
-0.148 0.198 0.301 0.033 0.009 0.289 -0.067 0.591 1.000  
(10) 
FEMALE PARTIC. 
2001 
0.105 0.305 0.062 -0.218 0.347 0.127 0.243 -0.148 -0.397 1.000 
 
Calculated data stem from OECD Newsletter (2005); OECD in Figures (2003); OECD Economic 
Outlook (2001); Perroti (2006); and World Development Indicators (2005). 
Significant coefficients are bold shifted. 
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